Amygdala volume linked to individual differences in mental state inference in early childhood and adulthood  by Rice, Katherine et al.
A
s
K
D
A
R
R
A
K
S
T
A
I
E
1
b
f
t
a
o
C
C
d
b
(
1
hDevelopmental Cognitive Neuroscience 8 (2014) 153–163
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Developmental Cognitive  Neuroscience
j ourna l h om epa ge: h t tp : / /www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /dcn
mygdala  volume  linked  to  individual  differences  in  mental
tate  inference  in  early  childhood  and  adulthood
atherine  Rice,  Brieana  Viscomi,  Tracy  Riggins,  Elizabeth  Redcay ∗
epartment of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, United States
a  r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 2 May  2013
eceived  in revised form 21 August 2013
ccepted 18 September 2013
eywords:
ocial cognition
heory of mind
mygdala
ndividual differences
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We investigated  the  role  of the amygdala  in mental  state  inference  in a  sample  of adults  and
in a  sample  of children  aged  4 and  6 years.  This  period  in  early  childhood  represents  a time
when  mentalizing  abilities  undergo  dramatic  changes.  Both  children  and  adults  inferred
mental  states  from  pictures  of others’  eyes,  and  children  also  inferred  the  mental  states  of
others from  stories  (e.g.,  a false  belief  task).  We  also  collected  structural  MRI data  from  these
participants,  to determine  whether  larger  amygdala  volumes  (controlling  for  age  and  total
gray matter  volume)  were  related  to better  face-based  and  story-based  mentalizing.  For
children,  larger  amygdala  volumes  were  related  to better  face-based,  but not  story-based,
mentalizing.  In contrast,  in  adults,  amygdala  volume  was  not  related  to face-based  mental-
izing. We  next  divided  the  face-based  items  into  two subscales:  cognitive  (e.g.,  thinking,  notarly  childhood believing) versus  affective  (e.g., friendly,  kind)  items.  For  children,  performance  on cognitive
items was  positively  correlated  with  amygdala  volume,  but for adults,  only  performance
on  affective  items  was  positively  correlated  with  amygdala  volume.  These  results  indicate
that the amygdala’s  role  in  mentalizing  may  be  speciﬁc  to face-based  tasks  and  that  the
ement
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. Introduction
The amygdala is involved in social cognition beyond
asic emotion processing (Adolphs, 2010). Recent research
rom  neuroimaging and lesion studies suggests an impor-
ant  role for the amygdala in inferring the thoughts, beliefs,
nd  desires of others—a construct often referred to as the-
ry  of mind or mentalizing (Adolphs et al., 2002; Baron-
ohen et al., 1999; Shaw et al., 2005; Stone et al., 2003).
ritically, most studies examining the role of the amyg-
ala  in social cognition have been conducted with adults,
ut  there is mounting evidence from studies in rodents
e.g., Hefner and Holmes, 2007), non-human primates (e.g.,
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Prather et al., 2001; Toscano et al., 2009) and humans
(e.g., Shaw et al., 2004) that the amygdala operates
differentially throughout development (cf. Adolphs, 2010).
Given  ﬁndings of amygdala dysfunction in a variety of
neurodevelopmental disorders—many of which, such as
autism,  involve social impairments—it is crucial to under-
stand the relation between amygdala development and the
development of social cognition (Schumann et al., 2011).
The  strongest evidence for the amygdala’s involve-
ment in mental state inferences comes when individuals
infer affective and cognitive states from faces, an ability
measured using the “Mind in the Eyes” task. This task
requires participants to infer a person’s mental state based
on  information from the eye region alone (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001). Participants choose from a set of labels, which
include both social emotions (e.g., ﬂirtatious) and cognitive
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.states  (e.g., contemplative), but not basic emotions (e.g.,
sad).  Individuals with unilateral or bilateral amygdala
lesions acquired at a wide variety of ages are consistently
impaired on this task, but do not show corresponding
NC-ND license.
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deﬁcits when matching basic emotion labels to the
same pictures (Adolphs et al., 2002; Shaw et al., 2005).
Consistent with these ﬁndings, the initial functional
neuroimaging study using the Mind in the Eyes reported
amygdala activation during mental state inference but
not  gender recognition in typical adults, and also reported
reduced amygdala activation in adults with autism (Baron-
Cohen  et al., 1999, although see Adams et al., 2010).
Despite evidence for the role of the amygdala in mak-
ing  mental state inferences from the eye region, studies of
story-based tasks that require participants to reason about
the  actions of others based on others’ beliefs do not typi-
cally  reveal amygdala involvement in adults (e.g., Gallagher
and  Frith, 2003). This contrast between face- and story-
based tasks could suggest that the amygdala’s involvement
in  mentalizing is speciﬁc to tasks involving face or eye
processing. This would be consistent with data suggesting
the  amygdala is especially sensitive to salient social stimuli,
particularly the eye region of the face (e.g., Kennedy and
Adolphs, 2010; Spezio et al., 2007).
An alternative to the above suggestion may  be that
the amygdala plays a more general role in mental state
inference during the development of mentalizing abili-
ties  in childhood, but that the region is not involved in
the  maintenance of these abilities in adults (cf. Apperly,
2011). Developmental evidence for amygdala involve-
ment in story-based mental inference comes from a lesion
study  which compared story-based mental state infer-
ence  for adults with early (i.e., 12 years) versus late
(i.e., 31 years) onset lesions, and found impairment only
in  the early lesion group (Shaw et al., 2004). How-
ever, researchers have yet to examine the amygdala’s
involvement at a point in typical development when com-
plex  mental state inference abilities are beginning to
emerge. Thus, it is not clear whether the amygdala is
involved in the development of both face-based and story-
based  mental inference, or whether the structure’s role
in  theory of mind development is limited to face-based
mental inference, as suggested by the adult neuroimaging
data.
To explore the role of the amygdala in the develop-
ment of theory of mind, we examined whether individual
differences in both face- and story-based mentalizing abil-
ities  are related to amygdala volume during an age marked
by  signiﬁcant advances in mentalizing abilities, namely
early childhood. Around four years of age, children con-
sistently pass the canonical assessment of false belief
understanding, which examines their ability to verbally
predict a character’s actions based on her false belief
(Wellman et al., 2001). Between four and six years of
age,  children demonstrate more sophisticated mentalizing
abilities, including an increased understanding of discrep-
ancies  between real and expressed emotion (Harris et al.,
1986)  and an increased capacity to make mental state
inferences from the eye regions of others (Peterson and
Slaughter, 2009).
Early  childhood is also a period of signiﬁcant increase
in amygdala volume. Although the amygdala increases in
size  through late adolescence (Giedd et al., 1996; Guo et al.,
2007;  Ostby et al., 2009; but see Sowell et al., 2002), the
growth rate slows around age ten (Uematsu et al., 2012).euroscience 8 (2014) 153–163
There  is suggestive evidence from adults that amygdala size
is  linked to social-cognitive abilities, as reﬂected in its cor-
relation  with larger social networks (Bickart et al., 2010),
better emotion comprehension (Dziobek et al., 2006),
stronger emotional learning (Exner et al., 2004), and, in
adults  with autism, less social impairment (Nacewicz et al.,
2006).  However, aside from a few studies of children with
autism  (Mosconi et al., 2009; Schumann et al., 2009), the
role  of amygdala growth in social-cognitive development
is relatively unexplored.
If  the amygdala is associated with the acquisition and
reﬁnement of mentalizing abilities more generally, cor-
relations between amygdala volume and social-cognitive
ability should be present for face- and story-based mental
state  inference tasks in early childhood. If the amygdala
plays a unique role in face-related mentalizing abilities,
child amygdala volume should be correlated with men-
tal  state inference from the eyes, but not from stories.
To test these alternative possibilities, we collected struc-
tural  MRI  data from a sample of four- and six-year-old
children, who also completed an age-appropriate Mind in
the  Eyes test and two tasks of story-based mental state
inference. The ﬁrst story-based task consisted of canoni-
cal  false belief measures, devoid of emotional terms. The
second  story-based task measured a child’s understanding
of the discrepancy between real and expressed emotion,
but, crucially, did not involve any face processing. Addi-
tionally, we  analyzed data from a comparison sample of
adults  who completed the adult version of the Mind in the
Eyes,  in order to determine if amygdala size was  related to
individual  differences at maturity.
2. Methods
The University of Maryland Institutional Review Board
approved all procedures prior to data collection. Adult par-
ticipants  and families were compensated monetarily for
their  time, and children also received a small toy for their
participation.
2.1.  Participants
2.1.1. Children
Fifty-two children, ages four or six years, were recruited
through a database of local families maintained by the Uni-
versity’s  Infant and Child Studies program and participated
in  the study with the informed consent of their parent
and/or legal guardian. Two  children were later revealed
to  have a sibling with an autism spectrum disorder and
were  thus excluded from all subsequent analyses. The
remaining 22 four-year-olds (13 females) and 28 six-year-
olds  (14 females) were full-term, native English speakers,
free of neurological damage, had no history of develop-
mental disorders and had no ﬁrst-degree relatives with
autism spectrum disorders or schizophrenia, as deter-
mined by a parent self-report questionnaire. Three of these
children  were only recruited to participate in the behav-
ioral  portion of the study. Of the remaining 47 children, 6
declined  to be scanned, leaving 41 children (15 four-year-
olds and 26 six-year-olds) with both brain and behavioral
data.
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.1.2. Adults
A  group of young adults, whose data were collected
s part of a larger study, served as a comparison group
rom a time point later in development. Adult partici-
ants were recruited through a paid university subject pool
nd  informed consent was collected from each participant.
he selected adult sample consisted of 20 individuals (9
emales),  aged 18–24 years (mean age = 21, SD = 1.5). Partic-
pants  were screened for neurological damage, for history
f  developmental disorders, and for ﬁrst-degree relatives
ith  autism or schizophrenia through a self-report ques-
ionnaire.
.2.  Assessments
.2.1. Children
Children completed a 2-h behavioral session, consist-
ng of a battery of age-appropriate theory of mind tasks
nd  an IQ assessment (Table 1). Full-scale IQ, verbal IQ
nd  non-verbal IQ were assessed using the Kaufman Brief
ntelligence Test Second Edition (KBIT-2; Kaufman and
aufman, 2004). Each child had one parent complete the
ocial  Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter et al.,
003),  which assesses social competence and can be used
s  a ﬁrst-pass indicator of autism spectrum disorders
Chandler et al., 2007).
The  contents of the theory of mind battery differed
omewhat between the two age groups and also included
ome tasks not reported here. The current analyses focus
nly  on the three tasks in common between the two  groups,
hich  are described below.
.2.1.1.  Child Mind in the Eyes task. All children completed
 preschool version of the Mind in the Eyes task, also known
s  the Simpliﬁed Eye Reading Test (Peterson and Slaughter,
009). This assessment is a modiﬁcation of the original
ind in the Eyes task for adults (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
nd  was designed for 4- to 6-year-old children. Children
ere presented with a static black-and-white image of an
dult’s  eye region, and the experimenter asked the children
hich  of two mental states (e.g., serious vs. joking) best
escribed the picture. Children had to pass a practice item
n  order to proceed to the full assessment of nine items,
esulting in a ﬁnal possible score of 0–9 that reﬂected the
umber of correct judgments.
.2.1.2.  False belief tasks. All children answered ques-
ions about three classic types of false belief tasks (false
elief contents, false belief location and second-order false
elief).  Children were presented with two scenarios for
ach  type of false belief, resulting in a false belief score
anging from 0 to 6 that reﬂected the number of cor-
ect judgments. These tasks are of increasing difﬁculty,
nd second-order false belief understanding is often not
chieved  until 7 years of age (Sullivan et al., 1994; Wellman
nd  Liu, 2004). As such, we expected robust individual
ifferences across groups. The false belief contents task
ssessed a child’s understanding that another character
ould have false beliefs about the content of a closed con-
ainer.  Children were presented two separate scenarios in
hich  they knew the true contents of a box (e.g., that a
aisin  box had pennies in it), and then were asked whateuroscience 8 (2014) 153–163 155
a  novel character would think was  in the box. Children
received full credit (i.e., 1 point) for each item if they
understood both the true contents of the box and that
the  character would have a false belief about the box’s
contents (e.g., would think the box contained raisins). In
the  false belief location task, children watched two  videos
depicting situations where an item (e.g., pencil) was moved
while  a character was  out of the room and were then
asked where the character would look for the item upon
return.  Responses were scored as correct (i.e., 1 point) if
children  understood the item’s true location and indicated
that  the character would look in the same place that he
had  originally left the item. The ﬁnal task was of a sim-
ilar  nature to the false belief location task, except that it
assessed understanding of second-order false belief. That
is,  a third character watched the false belief location sce-
narios  described previously. Children had to predict where
this  third character thought the protagonist would look for
her  object (e.g., “Where does Steve think Sarah will look
for  her apple?”). Responses were scored as correct if the
child  knew the true location of the object and predicted
the third character would name the object’s original loca-
tion.  As with the other two  tasks, children were presented
with two  second-order false belief scenarios.
2.2.1.3. Appearance-reality emotion task. All children were
administered a ﬁve-item test that measured their under-
standing of real versus apparent emotion (Harris et al.,
1986;  Wellman and Liu, 2004). Before administering the
speciﬁc  test items, the experimenter veriﬁed that the child
understood circumstances under which a character would
feel  happy, sad, or okay. For each item, the experimenter
played a story in which the protagonist would have rea-
son  to hide an emotional state (e.g., her brother is teasing
her  and if he knew how she felt, he would keep teasing
her). Children were asked how the protagonist really felt
and  how the protagonist tried to look. Children received
credit for the item if the discrepancy between the felt and
displayed emotion was in the correct direction (e.g., for the
teasing  item, participants could receive credit for saying
that  the protagonist felt okay and tried to look happy, or
for  saying that the protagonist felt sad and tried to look
okay  or happy). The ﬁnal possible range of scores was 0–5.
2.2.2.  Adults
Adult participants completed the adult version of the
Mind in the Eyes (Mind in the Eyes—Revised Eyes Test;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Like the child task, this task asked
adults  to identify the mental states of 36 black-and-white
photographs of adults’ eye regions. All but two of the 9 pho-
tographs  used in the child task were a subset of these adult
photos,  but with simpliﬁed vocabulary. Unlike the child
version, the adult task was not verbally administered and
had  four possible answer choices for each item. Adults also
completed the KBIT-2, which measured full scale IQ, verbal
IQ,  and non-verbal IQ (Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004).2.3.  Brain volumetric analysis
High-resolution  T1-weighted images were acquired
using a 12-channel head coil on a single Siemens
156 K. Rice et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 8 (2014) 153–163
Table  1
Characterization data for the full child sample and for the children who  contributed structural MRI  data.
Full group (N = 50) Usable MRI (N = 35) No MRI  (N = 12) Pairwise comparison:
no  MRI  vs. usable MRI
p-Value
Sex, M/F  23/27 20/15 2/10 X2 = 5.88 .015
Ages (4-year-olds/6-year-olds) 22/28 11/24 8/4 X2 = 4.61 .032
Full  Scale IQ 114.46 (11.23) 114.66 (11.65) 113.92 (10.38) t45 = −.195 .846
Verbal IQ 116.96 (11.27) 117.86 (11.59) 114.33 (10.30) t45 = −.933 .356
Nonverbal IQ 107.55 (13.24) 106.94  (13.59) 109.33 (12.56) t45 = .536 .595
SCQ  5.06 (3.85) 5.58 (4.11) 3.38 (2.33) t45 = −1.44 .161
Note: Data are mean (SD). IQ was measured using the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 2. Higher Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) scores represent
more  social difﬁculties. Three children were only recruited to complete the behavioral portion. Of the children without MRI  data, six declined to be scanned
e move(four  4-year-olds and two  6-year-olds), ﬁve were excluded due to excessiv
because  of a structural abnormality.
3T scanner (MAGNETOM Trio Tim System, Siemens
Medical Solutions). The scanning protocol for each
participant included one three-dimensional T1
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo (MPRAGE)
sequence (176 contiguous sagittal slices, voxel
size = 1.0 mm × 1.0 mm × 1.0 mm;  repetition time/echo
time/inversion time = 1900 ms/2.52 ms/900 ms;  ﬂip
angle = 9◦; pixel matrix = 256 × 256).
Five  of the child participants (three 4-year-olds and two
6-year-olds) had unusable structural data due to excessive
movement, and one child had unusable data due to a struc-
tural  abnormality, resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 35 children
with  usable brain and behavioral data: 11 four-year-olds (4
females)  and 24 six-year-olds (11 females) (Table 1).
Structural data were analyzed using FreeSurfer’s
standard automatic volumetric segmentation
(surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). This method has been
extensively described elsewhere (Dale et al., 1999;
Desikan et al., 2006; Fischl et al., 2002; Fischl, 2012) and
its  calculations of subcortical volumes are comparable
to manual segmentation (Lehmann et al., 2010; Morey
et  al., 2009; Tae et al., 2008). Analyses for all subjects
were completed using FreeSurfer Version 5.1.0 using a
Linux  terminal (RedHat 6.3) on a Macintosh computer
(Gronenschild et al., 2012). In short, the T1-weighted
images of each participant were compared to a proba-
bilistic atlas, generating new surface maps of gray matter,
white  matter, and pial boundries. Importantly for the
present study, the use of a common atlas via FreeSurfer has
been  validated in children aged 4–11 (Gosh et al., 2010)
and  in a study comparing 7-year-olds to adults (Burgund
et  al., 2002). Although reconstruction and volumetric
calculations are automatized, two independent trained
coders compared the new surface maps to the original
T1-weighted images, editing that surface’s segmentation
where necessary. After agreement between the coders,
automatic segmentation was rerun. This produced volu-
metric  data for bilateral amygdala, bilateral hippocampus,
and total gray matter, as well as a set of structures not
analyzed in the present study.
2.4. Data analysis2.4.1.  Subcomponents of Mind in the Eyes
The Mind in the Eyes contains items that require mak-
ing  inferences about more cognitive mental states (e.g.,ment (three 4-year olds and two 6-year olds), and one child was excluded
thinking) and more affective mental states (e.g., nervous), a
division  which has been employed in previous research. In a
study  of adults with amygdala lesions, Shaw and colleagues
(2005) separately analyzed items that depicted social emo-
tions  (e.g., hostile, ﬂirtatious) versus cognitive states (e.g.,
pensive,  contemplative), and these items produced dif-
ferential patterns of performance. Similarly, Peterson and
Slaughter  (2009) divided the preschooler version of the
task  into four cognitive and ﬁve affective items, although,
unlike the adult version, the affective items included some
basic  emotions (e.g., sad). Given the lack of past research
on  the neuroanatomical correlates of these disparate pro-
cesses,  especially for children, we conducted exploratory
analyses of these two  subscales. To enable cross-age com-
parisons in the present study, we  divided the adult Mind
in  the Eyes task into cognitive (21 items) and affective (15
items)  subscales.
In  order to compare the linguistic difﬁculty of the words
from the affective and cognitive subscales, we computed
word frequency for each item, using written frequency
measures for the adult items and verbal frequency meas-
ures  for the child items (Wilson, 1988). For the child
version of the Mind in the Eyes, there was no frequency
difference between the affective and cognitive subscales,
for  either the correct answers (t(7) = −1.22, p = .26) or
the  foils (t(7) = .90 p = .40). Similarly for the adult version,
there was  no signiﬁcant difference between subscales for
either  the correct answers (t(25) = 1.34, p = .19) or the foils
(t(54)  = 1.14, p = .26).
2.4.2. Statistical analyses
Past  research has employed several ways to control for
the  relation between head size and the volume of subcor-
tical  structures. An extensive meta-analysis indicated that
the  use of ratios (e.g., amygdala volume divided by total
intracranial volume) can introduce bias into correlations
between subcortical volumes and behavior, and suggested
that  controlling via regression is a better method (Van
Petten, 2004). Additionally, although intracranial volume is
often  used as a covariate, the same meta-analysis empha-
sized  that the size of structures like the hippocampus
and amygdala often scale with gray matter volume. Thus,
we  accounted for head size by controlling for total gray
matter volume in our regressions. Further, given poten-
tial  relationships between amygdala size, age, and task
performance, correlations between amygdala volume and
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he three mentalizing tasks (Mind in the Eyes, false belief
omposite, and appearance-reality emotion) controlled for
ontinuous  age in months and total gray matter volume.
Although some past research into the link between
mygdala size and social cognition has collapsed across the
eft  and right amygdala (e.g., Dziobek et al., 2006), we  ana-
yzed  results from the left and right amygdala separately,
iven evidence that the left and right amygdala may  mature
t  different rates in these understudied young groups (Hu
t  al., 2013; Uematsu et al., 2012). Further, there is some
vidence from adults that the left and right amygdala may
unction  differently in response to different types of emo-
ional  stimuli (e.g., Costafreda et al., 2008) or to different
ypes of mentalizing (Stone et al., 2003). In our analysis, left
nd  right hippocampus served as control regions in order to
ndicate  whether any observed correlations were speciﬁc
o  the amygdala (cf. Bickart et al., 2010; Blackmon et al.,
011).
.  Results
.1. Behavioral results
.1.1.  Mind in the Eyes performance in children
The Mind in the Eyes produced wide variability in
erformance across the two child age groups. A 2 (affec-
ive  subscale vs. cognitive subscale) × 2 (4-year-olds vs.
-year-olds) × 2 (male vs. female) mixed model ANOVA
evealed a signiﬁcant main effect of age (F(1,46) = 4.79,
 = .034) but not subscale type (F(1,46) = 1.61, p = .21) or sex
F(1,46)  = .30, p = .59). There was a signiﬁcant interaction
etween age group and subscale (F(1,46) = 15.29, p < .001)
riven  by signiﬁcant age-related improvement in the cog-
itive,  but not affective, subscale (cognitive: t(48) = −4.24,
 < .001; affective: t(48) = 1.41, p = .16; Fig. 1). The two-
ay interactions with sex, as well as the full three-way
nteraction, were not signiﬁcant. The task’s emotional and
ognitive  subscales were not correlated with each other
r(48)  = −.10, p = .51).
Mind in the Eyes performance was correlated with a
arental report of real-world social ability. Consistent with
revious  research, Mind in the Eyes scores within the full
ample  of children were signiﬁcantly related to SCQ scores,
ith  higher SCQ scores indicating more impairment in
ocial  communication (r(32) = −.54, p = .001).
Mind  in the Eyes performance was signiﬁcantly related
o  verbal IQ (r(45) = .30, p = .038), a correlation driven by
he  relation between verbal IQ and performance on the
ffective subscale (r(45) = .30, p = .040; cognitive subscale:
(45) = .10, p = .50). None of the correlations with non-
erbal IQ or full scale IQ were signiﬁcant for either the full
ssessment or the subscales.
.1.2.  Mind in the Eyes performance in adults
In the adult sample, we conducted a 2 (affective sub-
cale vs. cognitive subscale) × 2 (male vs. female) mixed
odel ANCOVA (covarying age) in order to test the
ffects of gender and subscale type. This analysis revealed
o  signiﬁcant interactions or main effects, including no
ffect  of subscale on percentage accuracy (mean cog-
itive: 71.9% [11.96]; mean affective: 75.67% [11.90];euroscience 8 (2014) 153–163 157
F(1,17) = 1.19, p = .29). Performance on the cognitive
subscale was  marginally correlated with performance on
the  affective subscale (r(18) = .39, p = .088). For the adults,
full-scale IQ was  marginally correlated with both the full
measure  (r(18) = .40, p = .082) and the affective subscale
(r(18) = .39, p = .090). Verbal IQ was marginally correlated
with the affective subscale (r(18) = .43, p = .056) and non-
verbal  IQ was  marginally correlated with cognitive subscale
performance (r(18) = .41, p = .075).
3.1.3. Story-based theory of mind performance in
children
Consistent with prior literature, four-year-olds per-
formed worse than six-year-olds on both the false belief
composite (false belief: 47.22% [37.02] vs. 77.98% [25.58],
t(47)  = −3.44, p = .001) and the appearance-reality emo-
tion  task (31.43% [28.69] vs. 61.43% [38.85], t(47) = −3.98,
p  = .005). Unlike the Mind in the Eyes, neither scale was sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with SCQ scores (all rs < .20). As with
the  Mind in the Eyes, there was  no correlation between
nonverbal IQ and performance on either story-based task,
although  the appearance-reality emotion task was  corre-
lated  with verbal IQ (r(45) = .33, p = .023).
Mind in the Eyes performance was  marginally corre-
lated with the appearance-reality emotion task (r(47) = .24,
p  = .098). This correlation was  driven by a signiﬁcant corre-
lation  between the appearance-reality emotion task and
the  cognitive subscale (r(47) = .41, p = .003), which was
signiﬁcantly stronger than the correlation between the
appearance-reality emotion task and the affective subscale
(r(47)  = −.10, p = .48; the difference between the correla-
tions was  signiﬁcant at z = 2.50, p = .012). Neither the full
Mind  in the Eyes task nor the subscales were correlated
with the false belief composite score (all r(47)s < .15).
3.2. Volumetric analyses
3.2.1.  Age-related differences in amygdala volume
A comparison of the four-year-olds, six-year-olds,
and adults revealed a signiﬁcant effect of age on both
left and right amygdala volume (F(2,52) = 10.74, p < .001;
F(2,52) = 12.85, p < .001; Fig. 2). Pairwise Tukey com-
parisons indicated that the four-year-old children had
marginally smaller left amygdala volumes than the six-
year-olds (1.41 cm3 [.18] vs. 1.55 cm3 [.18], p = .085), but
there  was no signiﬁcant difference in right amygdala vol-
umes  (1.49 cm3 [.17] vs. 1.64 cm3 [.22], p = .17). Adult left
and  right amygdala volumes were signiﬁcantly larger than
the  corresponding structures in both the four-year-old and
six-year-old groups (left: 1.72 cm3 [.19]; right: 1.88 cm3
[.23]; all ps < .05). Within the adults, there was no relation
between age and either left or right amygdala volume (all
r(18)s  < .2).
For both children and adults, left and right amygdala
volume were signiﬁcantly related to total gray matter vol-
ume  (all ps < .01). The main effect of age on amygdala
size held even after controlling for total gray matter vol-
ume  (left: F(2,51) = 24.30, p < .001; right: F(2,51) = 32.50,
p  < .001). After controlling for total gray matter volume,
there was  no signiﬁcant effect of sex on either left or right
amygdala volume for the full sample, nor was  this relation
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Fig. 1. Age-related changes in face-based and story-based mental state inference
Fig. 2. Age-related changes in left and right amygdala volume. The hori-
zontal line at the center of each box represents the median, and the upper
and lower boundaries of each box represent the 75th and 25th percentiles,
respectively. The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum, except
when the maximum value is more than 1.5 times the interquartile range
beyond the 75th percentile. These data points are represented as outliers.
There was  a signiﬁcant effect of age on both left and right amygdala vol-
tion  between the full Mind in the Eyes assessment and
amygdala volume, but there was a signiﬁcant correlation
between right amygdala volume and the affective subscale.
Again, after correcting the model for age and total gray
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Six-year-olds
Four-year-oldsume  even after controlling for total gray matter. Both groups of children
had signiﬁcantly smaller left and right amygdala volumes than adults, but
there  was no signiﬁcant difference between the four-and six-year-olds.
signiﬁcant for children and adults considered separately.
Given the fact that sex was not related to either behavioral
performance or to amygdala size after controlling for total
gray  matter volume, sex was not included as a covariate in
the  correlation analyses below.
3.2.2. Correlation with Mind in the Eyes performance
For children, the correlation between amygdala vol-
ume  and Mind in the Eyes performance was signiﬁcant
for the left amygdala and approached signiﬁcance for the
right  amygdala (Table 2). Given that brain size and age
could  be related to both of these variables, we repeated
the analysis controlling for age and gray matter volume.ce Task
. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. **p < .01; ***p < .001.
In  this model, the effect was not statistically signiﬁcant.
We  next examined the correlation between amygdala vol-
ume  and the cognitive and affective subscales. Cognitive
subscale performance and left amygdala volume were sig-
niﬁcantly  related in both the uncorrected and corrected
models (Fig. 3). To further parse the inﬂuence of age on
this  relation, we also examined four- and six-year-olds sep-
arately.  The uncorrected correlation for the four-year-olds
between the cognitive subscale and left amygdala volume
was  signiﬁcant, although this correlation did not survive
correction for total gray matter volume. For none of the
comparisons or age groups were the correlations for the
left  and right amygdala signiﬁcantly different from each
other.
As  the adult sample was intended to be a compari-
son point for the child sample, we repeated our analyses
for adults. In an uncorrected model, there was no rela-Fig. 3. Relation between left amygdala volume and performance on the
Mind in the Eyes cognitive subscale for four-and six-year-old children. All
values are corrected for total gray matter volume and for age in months.
The regression line represents the best ﬁt for the entire child sample.
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Table 2
Uncorrected and corrected correlations between amygdala volume and performance on the Mind in the Eyes.
Full child sample 4-Year-olds 6-Year-olds Adult
Raw Corrected Raw Corrected Raw Corrected Raw Corrected
Full Mind in the Eyes
Left  amygdala .38* .19 .42 .29 .32 .17 .16 .27
Right amygdala .31# .08 .15 −.14 .31 .13 .27 .43#
Cognitive subscale
Left  amygdala .42* .35* .61* .51 .19 .20 .004 .08
Right amygdala .28 .13 .27 −.07 .15 .17 .004 .17
Affective subscale
Left  amygdala .19 .01 −.004 .09 .34 .10 .32 .43#
Right amygdala .19 .002 −.13 −.10 .36# .07 .53* .65**
# p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01
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(ote: All correlations are Pearson’s r values. The corrected correlations fo
otal  gray matter volume. The corrected correlations that appear in 4- an
atter volume, the correlation between affective perfor-
ance  and right amygdala volume remained signiﬁcant
Fig. 4) and approached signiﬁcance for the left amyg-
ala. There was a signiﬁcant difference between the right
mygdala’s signiﬁcant partial correlation with the affective
ubscale and its negligible partial correlation with the cog-
itive  subscale (z = 2.18, p = .030). The partial correlations
etween right amygdala volume and affective subscale per-
ormance  were signiﬁcantly different for the child and adult
amples  (z = −2.45, p = .014), although the child scale, but
ot  the adult scale, included a few basic emotions (e.g., sad).
Given  that IQ was correlated with Mind in the Eyes per-
ormance for children, we investigated the potential role
f  IQ in the signiﬁcant relations between amygdala vol-
me  and Mind in the Eyes performance. For the children,
ull-scale IQ and non-verbal IQ, but not verbal IQ, were
orrelated with bilateral amygdala volume and total gray
atter  volume (all ps < .05). In a model that also included
ge and total gray matter volume, the correlation between
eft  amygdala volume and cognitive subscale performance
as still marginally signiﬁcant after covarying verbal IQ
r(30)  = .33, p = .068), non-verbal IQ (r(30) = .32, p = .075),
r  full-scale IQ (r(30) = .30, p = .091). In the adult sample,
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ig. 4. Relation between right amygdala volume and Mind in the Eyes performanc
left  panel) but not cognitive (right panel) subscales in adults. All values are correl child sample and the adult sample are corrected for age in months and
-old columns are corrected only for total gray matter volume.
no  IQ measure was signiﬁcantly correlated with amyg-
dala volume or total gray matter volume. For the adults,
the  signiﬁcant relation between right amygdala volume
and  affective subscale performance persisted even with
the  addition of verbal IQ, nonverbal IQ, or full-scale IQ to
a  model controlling for age and total gray matter volume
(ps  < .01).
3.2.3. Correlation with story-based theory of mind tasks
Neither left nor right amygdala volume was signiﬁcantly
correlated with either the false belief composite score or
the  appearance-reality emotion task, either in the original
or  partial correlations (all rs < .2).
3.2.4.  Speciﬁcity of the relation between amygdala
volume and social-cognitive ability
To determine the speciﬁcity of the relationship between
amygdala size and Mind in the Eyes performance, we used
the  hippocampus as a control region. Within both the adult
and  child samples, none of the uncorrected or corrected (for
age  and total gray matter volume) correlations between
bilateral hippocampal volume and Mind in the Eyes perfor-
mance,  for the full task or either subscale, were signiﬁcant.
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e for adults. Right amygdala volume was signiﬁcantly related to affective
cted for total gray matter volume and for age in months.
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None of the uncorrected or corrected correlations between
bilateral hippocampus and either story-based task (false
belief  composite and appearance-reality emotion) were
signiﬁcant.
4.  Discussion
In the current study, we probed the association between
amygdala volume and theory of mind development by
examining the relation between amygdala size and mental
state  inference in early childhood and adulthood. Lesion
and  neuroimaging studies of adults have revealed a role
for  the amygdala in making mental state inferences from
faces,  as measured by the Mind in the Eyes. In children,
the amygdala’s role in mental state inference is less clear,
with  some evidence for its involvement not just in face-
based  mentalizing, but also in inferring a character’s belief
from  a story (e.g., the classic false belief task). In the cur-
rent  study, amygdala volume was signiﬁcantly related to
face-based  mental state inference in children; those with
larger  left amygdala volumes had higher Mind in the Eyes
scores.  In contrast, amygdala volume was not related to
performance on story-based tasks, including a task that
included emotion words. This suggests that even in early
childhood, when mental state reasoning is undergoing
signiﬁcant changes, amygdala volume is not related to
individual differences in story-based tasks. This lack of a
correlation is consistent with much of the adult lesion
literature, which has found that patients with amygdala
lesions are impaired only on face-based theory of mind. The
present  study supports that idea that, throughout develop-
ment,  the amygdala’s role in theory of mind may  be speciﬁc
to  making mental state inferences from the eye region of
faces.
Intriguingly, in our adult sample, the correlation
between bilateral amygdala volume and Mind in the Eyes
performance was only marginally signiﬁcant for the right
amygdala (and not signiﬁcant for the left). This lack of
a  signiﬁcant relation between Mind in the Eyes and the
amygdala in adulthood is not unprecedented. Since the
original  Mind in the Eyes neuroimaging study (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999), several replications have failed to ﬁnd
amygdala activation (e.g., Adams et al., 2010; Moor et al.,
2012),  and not all individuals with adult amygdala lesions
show  Mind in the Eyes impairment (Stone et al., 2003). One
possible  explanation for these mixed ﬁndings is that the
present  correlations are based on structural imaging data,
which  may  not be sensitive enough to detect online use of
the  amygdala during mental state tasks. However, previous
research has shown robust correlations between amygdala
size  and various social measures (e.g., social network size
and  emotion comprehension; Bickart et al., 2010; Dziobek
et  al., 2006). A second possibility is that the amygdala
may  only be involved in affective mental state inferences
(Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), and the Mind in the
Eyes  contains two distinct types of mental-state inferences:
cognitive (e.g., thinking, not believing) and affective (e.g.,
friendly,  hostile). Consistent with the latter hypothesis,
the affective subscale of the Mind in the Eyes was  corre-
lated  with right amygdala volume, and this correlation waseuroscience 8 (2014) 153–163
signiﬁcantly  larger than the right amygdala’s correlation
with the cognitive subscale.
In contrast to the adults, the children did not show a
signiﬁcant relationship between the affective subscale and
left  or right amygdala volume. Instead, in early childhood,
larger left amygdala volumes were correlated with better
performance on the cognitive subscale. We caution against
strong  interpretations for laterality effects in these data,
given  that we had no speciﬁc hypotheses with regard to
differences in laterality between the age groups and at no
point  in development were left and right amygdala corre-
lations  signiﬁcantly different from each other.
These correlations from children and adults suggest a
possible  developmental shift in the role of the amygdala
in theory of mind. Although overall analysis of the child
sample indicated a signiﬁcant correlation with cognitive
mental state inference, this effect was driven by the four-
year-old group; by age six, the amygdala was  no longer
related to this type of inference. Further, the adult correla-
tion  between amygdala volume and the affective subscale
was  signiﬁcantly larger than the corresponding correlation
in  children. The lack of a correlation between amygdala size
and  affective mental state inference in children may simply
be  due to the differences between the child and adult ver-
sions  of the Mind in the Eyes task. Speciﬁcally, unlike for
the  adults, the child affective items contained both basic
emotions (e.g., sad) and social emotions (e.g., friendly),
although the set of affective items was  too small to analyze
the  two  types separately. By the age of six, most chil-
dren have acquired basic emotion understanding (Borke,
1973;  Brown and Dunn, 1996; Widen and Russell, 2003).
Thus,  individual differences in basic emotion labeling may
reﬂect  variability in task performance, whereas individual
differences in the complex social emotional domain may  be
more  likely to reﬂect meaningful developmental advances.
Future research should investigate the link between amyg-
dala  volume and the inference of complex social emotions
at  these younger ages.
The  exact mechanism behind this potential develop-
mental shift in the role of the amygdala in interpreting
cognitive mental states in children but not adults is unclear,
but  it represents a promising direction for future studies.
Testing larger samples in late childhood and adolescence
will be necessary to determine when the role of the amyg-
dala  in mentalizing changes. Examining these correlations
at  even younger ages would also be informative, given that
basic  emotion recognition improves before age four (Borke,
1973;  Russell and Bullock, 1986; Widen and Russell, 2003),
and  that amygdala overgrowth in autism appears to hap-
pen  before that time point as well (Schumann et al., 2009).
The  ﬁndings from the present study indicate that
although amygdala volume is not related to all mental-
izing processes (e.g., false belief understanding), it does
play  a role in complex social cognition in early childhood.
There are two potential explanations for the amygdala’s
involvement: ﬁrst, that the amygdala is directly involved
in  inferring cognitive states; and second, that the amyg-
dala  is linked to the same processes that lead to better
cognitive inference. While we cannot disambiguate these
two  possibilities using the current data, some evidence
suggests the latter may  be more likely. Although often
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haracterized as an emotion processing region, the amyg-
ala  processes salient or ambiguous aspects of the
nvironment more generally, and this role may  account for
ts  involvement in bottom-up direction of attention to the
yes—a  highly salient region of the face (Adolphs, 2010;
ennedy and Adolphs, 2010). For example, one neuroimag-
ng  study found that, when viewing faces, participants with
ore  amygdala activation spent more time looking at the
ye  region (Gamer and Buchel, 2009). Thus, it is possi-
le  that the children in our sample with larger amygdalae
re more attuned to the eye region in daily life, and this
ttention has allowed them to better learn the relationship
etween facial expressions and cognitive mental states. At
east  in atypical development, more attention to the eye
egion  is related to less social disability in children (Jones
t  al., 2008; Rice et al., 2012). Concurrent examination
f visual attention to full faces would help disambiguate
he mechanism linking amygdala volume to individual dif-
erences  in mentalizing. Additionally, longitudinal designs
ould  help determine the causal relationship between
mygdala size and behavior. Perhaps larger amygdalae are
 result of years of increased attention to the eyes and faces
f  others, or perhaps this biological difference leads to more
ttention  to the eye region, which is reﬂected in better
ind in the Eyes performance.
Although  this paper focuses exclusively on total amyg-
ala  size, the amygdala is composed of several nuclei,
hich may  each play a different role in social cognition.
urthermore, these nuclei are part of a larger whole-brain
etwork and show differential patterns of structural and
unctional connectivity (Saygin et al., 2012). Examining
ow changes in the amygdala’s functional and structural
onnections, both for the whole structure and for speciﬁc
uclei, relate to mental state inference may  help illuminate
he  speciﬁc mechanisms linking amygdala development
nd social cognition. Further, functional studies may  bet-
er  reﬂect online engagement of the amygdala in a
roader set of social-cognitive abilities, engagement which
ay  not be reﬂected in individual differences in brain
tructures.
One  important caveat is that the current study’s meas-
res of social cognition are divorced from a real world
ontext in which a child is an active participant in an
nteraction. This is especially true for the story-based meas-
res,  which are acted out with toys and can be reasoned
hrough with explicit verbal strategies. For example, many
igh  functioning adults with autism are able to success-
ully complete false belief tasks but still show deﬁcits on
eal-time theory of mind understanding (Senju et al., 2009).
lthough  the Mind in the Eyes does not portray a real
ime  social interaction, the task does require the processing
f  non-verbal social information more akin to real world
ituations. This discrepancy between story-based and face-
ased  tasks is supported by the fact that, in the present
ample, only performance on the face-based tasks was
orrelated with parental report of a child’s social and com-
unicative difﬁculties. Future studies could attempt to link
he  amygdala to children’s real world social interactions,
hich is an especially important direction given that theseypes  of interactions are the most frequently impaired in
isorders  like autism (Klin et al., 2003).euroscience 8 (2014) 153–163 161
5. Conclusion
The current study ﬁnds that amygdala volume is related
to  face-based but not story-based mental state inference
in  early childhood. It also presents preliminary evidence
that, in early childhood, larger amygdala volume is related
to  better performance on face-based cognitive inferences
(e.g., that someone looks like she is thinking); however,
in  adulthood, amygdala volume is positively related only
to  affective inferences (e.g., that someone looks friendly).
Beyond this speciﬁc ﬁnding, this study provides one of the
ﬁrst  links between individual differences in regional brain
volumes  and individual differences in behavior in typi-
cally  developing preschool-aged children. Early childhood
represents a time of signiﬁcant behavioral change across
domains, but obtaining functional neuroimaging data from
such  young children is difﬁcult; structural neuroimaging
provides a promising avenue to establish brain-behavior
relationships during this important developmental win-
dow.
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